ABSTRACT Multi-tenant service-oriented systems (SOSs) have become a major software engineering paradigm in the cloud environment. Instead of serving a single end-user, a multi-tenant SOS provides multiple tenants with similar and yet customized functionalities and potentially different quality-of-service (QoS) values. Multiple tenants' differentiated multi-dimensional quality constraints for the SOS further complicates the NP-hard problem of quality-aware service selection. Existing quality aware service selection approaches suffer from poor success rates of finding a solution, especially in scenarios where tenants' quality constraints are stringent, due to the lack of systematic consideration of three critical issues: 1) the need to fulfil multiple tenants' differentiated quality constraints; 2) the competition among service providers; and 3) the complementarity between services. This paper proposes a novel approach called combinatorial auctionbased service selection for multi-tenant SOSs (CASSMT) to support effective quality-aware service selection for multi-tenant SOSs. CASSMT allows service providers to bid for the services of an SOS expressively. Based on received bids (i.e., QoS offers), CASSMT attempts to find a solution that achieves the system developer's optimization goal while fulfilling all tenants' quality constraints for the SOS. When no solution can be found based on the current bids, service providers can improve their bids to increase their chances of winning, which in the meantime, increases the chances of finding a solution. The experimental results show that CASSMT outperforms representative approaches in the success rate of finding a solution and system optimality. Meanwhile, its efficiency, measured by the number of auction rounds and computation time, is demonstrated to be satisfactory in scenarios on different scales.
often differ in their quality values. To compose a multi-tenant SOS, the system developer needs to select appropriate services that collectively fulfil all tenants' quality constraints, e.g., throughput, response time, reliability, reputation and availability, and achieve an optimization goal, e.g., minimum system cost or maximum system utility.
In the past decade, many approaches for quality-aware service selection have been proposed to compose single tenant SOSs [1] [2] [3] , [37] and multi-tenant SOSs [6] , [20] , [25] , [28] , including ours [32] , [18] . However, none of the existing approaches has systematically considered three critical issues that challenge their success rates of finding a solution: 1) multi-tenancy, i.e., the ability for an SOS to serve multiple tenants simultaneously based on a single application instance; 2) provider competition, the competition between service providers has not been fully explored in the open and competitive cloud environment; and 3) service complementarity, i.e., the complementarity between the quality of multiple services.
A. MULTI-TENANCY
In the cloud environment, a tenant of a multi-tenant system is an organizational entity that hosts a number of end users and subscribes to the system according to the pay-as-you-go business model [32] . In order to serve multiple clients costeffectively in the cloud environment, an SOS must achieve multi-tenancy. Building a multi-tenant SOS involves work on different levels, including data-center level, infrastructure level and application level [16] . In this research, we focus on quality management for multi-tenant SOS on the application level where the system quality is guaranteed through composition of services with the ''right'' quality values. The tenants of a multi-tenant SOS usually have differentiated multi-dimensional quality constraints for the SOS. For example, one tenant might prefer a low response time while another tenant cares more about a low price. In a market where even 100ms extra delay can cost 1% drop in sales [26] , fulfilling all tenants' multi-dimensional quality constraints is critical to the success of a multi-tenant SOS. In addition, a multitenant SOS often needs to achieve the system developer's optimization goal, e.g., minimum system cost (the cost of using the component services), or maximum system utility. In the past decade, many optimization models and approaches have been proposed to compose single-tenant SOSs [1] [2] [3] , [37] . The quality of such an SOS is optimized for only one tenant. Thus, multi-tenancy renders existing singletenant approaches obsolete and impractical.
B. PROVIDER COMPETITION
The development and popularity of e-business, e-commerce, especially the pay-as-you-go business model promoted by cloud computing have fueled the growth of web services [16] . The statistics published by ProgrammableWeb, 1 an online web service directory, indicates a rapid growth in the 1 http://www.programmableweb.com/ number of published web services in the past few years. This enables the development of various SOSs that fulfil different organizations' increasingly sophisticated business needs [4] . The popularity of web services, service-oriented architecture and cloud computing is turning the cloud environment into a competitive environment in which service providers compete for service contracts [15] , i.e., the contracts for the provision of services. In such an environment, service selection for an SOS is a complex decision-making process that involves two stakeholders, i.e., system developer and service providers. On one hand, the system developer can benefit from exploiting the provider competition among service providers, which increases the success rate of finding a solution, especially in severe scenarios where stringent quality constraints are imposed on the SOS. In addition, the competition makes it more likely for the system developer to be able to obtain satisfactory QoS offers, i.e., offers that specify promised quality of services. Thus, the competition can increase the system optimality, i.e., the degree to which the system developer's optimization goal is achieved. Therefore, during service selection, the system developer should negotiate service level agreements (SLAs) with multiple candidate service providers and then select the best QoS offer for each service [14] , [22] , [34] . On the other hand, service providers' profits increase when the numbers of service contracts won increase. This is a strong incentive for service providers that can provide multiple types of services to propose competitive QoS offers and upgrade their QoS offers in order to win more service contracts.
C. SERVICE COMPLEMENTARITY
In the open and competitive cloud environment, complementarity can often be found between services [11] , [13] -they can be provided at better QoS levels together by a single provider than by multiple individual providers. Think of two different scenarios of a double-layer encryption SOS composed of two services that use different encryption schemes. When the two services are provided by a single provider rather than two individual providers, a shorter response time is expected from the SOS because both encryption operations are performed in-house by the service provider without having to transmit the intermediate data across organizational boundaries. In addition, a lower system cost is expected because a discount for a service bundle offered by the service provider is potentially available. Such advantages offered by the service providers, e.g., decrease in cost and response time, increase in throughput, etc., are generally referred to as quality premium in this paper. Thus, service providers that are capable of providing complementary services will be able to gain advantages over other service providers during the SLA negotiation as they can offer better QoS at lower prices.
None of the existing quality-aware service selection approaches has systematically considered all the above mentioned three critical issues. A new approach is needed. Auction has been proven to be an effective and efficient 35646 VOLUME 7, 2019 one-to-many negotiation method in a competitive environment [23] , [30] , especially when the items to be allocated exhibit complementarities [11] . In many e-commerce cases, such as Amazon.com, eBay.com and Overstock.com, auction has successfully captured the preferences of both buyers and sellers and ensured their satisfaction. However, traditional single-item auctions are unsuitable for service composition scenarios where multiple services are involved. In [19] , we proposed CASS, a quality-aware service selection approach for single-tenant SOSs based on combinatorial auction. However, CASS is designed for single-tenant SOSs and thus cannot handle multiple tenants' quality constraints simultaneously. To serve multiple tenants, CASS needs to run multiple auctions, one for each individual tenant. This easily results in a sub-optimal solution to the multi-tenant SOS. To address this issue, this paper proposes an approach called CASSMT to support Combinatorial Auction-based Service Selection for Multi-Tenant SOSs. Given tenants' quality constraints and system developer's optimization goal for a multi-tenant SOS, CASSMT holds a combinatorial auction. In the auction, the tasks of the SOS are auctioned as items and service providers, as bidders, can place bids, i.e., QoS offers, for the tasks. If an optimal solution that can fulfil all tenants' quality constraints is found based on the bids, the system developer, as the auctioneer in the auction, awards the service contracts to the winning bidders who are responsible for delivering the services at runtime according to their QoS offers. CASSMT can properly handle multi-tenancy, elicit the competition between service providers and utilize the complementarity between services.
The major contributions of this paper are:
• CASSMT handles multi-tenancy by attempting to find an optimal solution that fulfils all tenants' quality constraints. This allows the system developer to build an SOS that fulfils multiple tenants' quality constraints simultaneously.
• CASSMT exploits the competition among service providers by creating an open negotiation and competition platform. This increases the system developer's chances of obtaining satisfactory QoS offers for building the target SOS.
• CASSMT accommodates the complementarity between services by allowing bidders to flexibly bid for task bundles with quality premiums based on service complementarity. This also increases a system developer's chances of obtaining satisfactory QoS offers for building the target SOS.
• Extensive experiments are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of CASSMT using a public dataset, which contains over 2,500 real-world web services. The results demonstrate that CASSMT outperforms representative approaches in the success rate of finding a solution, especially in scenarios where tenants' quality constraints are stringent, as well as system optimality. In the meantime, its efficiency is satisfactory in most, if not all, cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the research problem with a motivating example. Section 3 introduces some preliminaries. Section 4 introduces the procedure of CASSMT, followed by the mechanisms of CASSMT described in Section 5. Section 6 presents the experimental evaluation. Section 7 describes the related work. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and outlines future work.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE AND PROBLEM ANALYSIS
To illustrate the motivation of this research, this section presents a travel booking SOS originated from [11] that serves multiple tenants. There are four levels of multi-tenancy maturity that offer different configurability, efficiency and scalability in utilizing resources to serve multiple tenants simultaneously [11] . The service level approach for building SOSs at the second maturity level demonstrates the best performance in finding a solution [11] . Furthermore, the data isolation enabled by the second maturity level offers the best data security and privacy for tenants [10] . Therefore, in this research, we focus on the second maturity level of multitenancy, where one system instance is composed that enacts independent execution plans, each specifically customized for one tenant.
As shown in Figure 1 , the travel booking SOS has three tenants: 1) P&O Cruise, which requires the cruise ticket search and insurance quote services; 2) Rail Plus, which requires the train ticket search and hotel search services; and 3) Webjet, which requires the airline ticket search, car rental, hotel search and insurance quote services. These travel agents usually have different multidimensional constraints for the quality of the SOS. For instance, P&O Cruise requires a very fast response time despite a high price, while Webjet is more concerned about minimizing the overall cost of using the SOS. In the meantime, the system developer also has its own optimization goal, e.g., to minimize the system cost or to maximize the system utility. Three sets of services must be selected from the candidate services to enact the three execution plans for the SOS to serve the corresponding tenants with satisfactory quality and achieve the system developer's optimization goal. Here, we suppose that the system developer wants to minimize the system cost. In Figure 1 , three execution plans are that (1) Webjet contains s 1,3 , s 2,5 , s 3,3 and s 6,2 , (2) P&O Cruise contains s 5,1 and s 6, 5 , and (3) Rail Plus contains s 4,2 and s 3, 6 .
Similar to other research efforts [1] [2] [3] , [18] , [37] , we assume that alternative functionally-equivalent services are available and can be categorized based on their functionalities and that the candidate services in a category often differ in their QoS values. For example, an airline ticket search service provided by a service provider, e.g., s 1,1 , returns the search results faster than another airline ticket search service provided by a different service provider, e.g., s 1, 3 , but requires a higher price.
Some service providers may be capable of providing multiple services, e.g., the airline ticket search, car rental and hotel search services. More importantly, they can offer better QoS offers for these services because these services often exhibit complementarity -they can be provided at better QoS levels by a single provider than multiple individual providers. For example, the overall response time of the airline ticket search, car rental and hotel search services can be reduced if they are provided by the same provider because the results from executing the previous service can be immediately processed by the next service without cross-organizational data transmission. Since such multi-functional service providers are capable of providing more services (and usually willing to for more profit), quality premiums are negotiable between the system developer and the service providers. For example, a service provider may charge a lower price for the airline ticket service if the system developer also uses its insurance quote service. Thus, the service providers should be able to express such quality premiums in their QoS offers flexibly. Those potentially available quality premiums increase the possibility of finding appropriate services for the SOS, especially when the quality constraints for the SOS are severe.
Sometimes, a solution for the SOS cannot be found based on the current QoS offers. For example, using even the cheapest services still exceeds the system developer's budget for the SOS. In such cases, the service providers should be allowed to improve their QoS offers. Then, based on the improved offers, the system developer can try again to find a solution. In addition, to make sure that the negotiation proceeds in a desirable direction towards a satisfactory solution, guidance should be provided to the service providers on how to improve their QoS offers in order to be included as part of the final solution.
III. PRELIMINARIES
CASSMT employs combinatorial auction to manage the complex negotiation between the system developer and service providers over multi-dimensional quality of multiple services. In the auction, service providers use a specific bidding language to propose QoS offers as bids for the tasks of an SOS. The winning bids will determine which providers' services are selected for building the SOS. This section introduces the basic concepts of combinatorial auction and the bidding language.
A. COMBINATORIAL AUCTION
Combinatorial auction is recognized as a type of auction in which bidders can bid for task bundles, rather than just individual services. Combinatorial auction has been considered to be a very effective and efficient method for the allocation of multiple items [32] , [11] and thus has been employed to solve many practical problems in various domains, e.g., railroad tracks [32] , real estate [32] , and advertising space [32] .
In a combinatorial auction, a seller sells m items to n bidders. Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m } be the set of items and B be the bids submitted by the bidders. A bid is represented by a tuple (I i , p i ), I i = Ø and I i ⊆ I , where I i represents the set of items that the bid is placed on and p i is the price for I i . The key problem of the combinatorial auction is winner determination, i.e., to select a subset {(I 1 , p 1 ), (I 2 , p 2 ), . . . , (I n , p n )} of B that fulfils the following two constraints:
and meanwhile, maximizes the auction revenue:
where profit (I i ) is the profit obtained from I i .
Constraint (1) ensures that all items are covered by the selected bids. Constraint (2) ensures that every item is included in only one selected bid.
One of the major advantages of combinatorial auctions is that the bidders can flexibly express their preferences for different items. This is particularly important when the items are complementary.
B. BIDDING LANGUAGE
During the auction, a suitable bidding language allows bidders to express their preferences flexibly and concisely [32] . It should not be overly expressive because that would unnecessarily increase the complexity of the auction. For example, given a set S of n items, the total number of possible combinations of k items is C(n, k), i.e., the k-combinations of S. If a bidding language requires a bidder to attach a value to each possible combination of items, a bidder has to submit a bid of size C(n, 1) + C(n, 2) + . . . + C(n, n) = 2 n − 1, which is only practically feasible for very small n. The exclusive-or (XOR) bidding language can express the complementarities between services flexibly and straightforward in a combinatorial auction and has been selected in many applications of combinatorial auction [32] . It can express all possible preference and then is more expressive than OR. Therefore, CASSMT employs the XOR bidding language [11] . In the context of this research, using the XOR bidding language, a bidder can submit bids in the form of (
. . , T n are different task bundles stating the semantics ''I can perform any one of these task bundles.''
IV. CASSMT PROCEDURE
Given as input of the functional specification of a multi-tenant SOS, the tenants' constraints and an optimization goal for the system quality, CASSMT can hold an iterative combinatorial auction to realize SLA negotiation for the SOS. The success of the auction will produce a set of QoS offers that collectively fulfil all tenants' quality constraints and achieve the optimization goal. As presented in Figure 2 , the procedure of CASSMT consists of six steps:
Step 1: At the beginning of the auction, tenants submit their requirements for the SOS to the system developer (i.e., auctioneer), including both the functionalities that the tenants need from the SOS and their multi-dimensional quality constraints for the SOS.
Step 2: Service providers that are capable and interested in participating the auction submit their bids. If the bids are valid, the service providers are officially acknowledged as bidders. A bid is considered invalid if it does not contain complete QoS information as required.
Step 3: The auctioneer determines the current winning bids -the winning bids in the current round -based on the received bids. The winning bid determination is the key to the auction and is detailed in Section 5.1.
Step 4: The auctioneer checks the stop criterion. If the stop criterion is met, the auction stops.
Step 5: If the stop criterion is not met, e.g., a solution cannot be found, the auction needs to continue. Ask-QoSs are generated, which are the offers for QoS asked by the auctioneer. The generation of ask-QoS is discussed in Section 5.2.
Step 6: Ask-QoSs are distributed to bidders, along with the current winning bids. A deadline for the bidders to propose their next bids is also sent.
Steps 2 to 5 are repeated until the stop criterion is met which is to satisfy all tenants' quality constraints for the SOS. When Step 2 is repeated, according to the received ask-QoSs and the current winning bids, bidders can respond by 1) refusing the ask-QoS and keeping their current bids in the auction until beaten, or 2) accepting the ask-QoS, or 3) proposing even better bids, e.g., lower cost, higher reliability, etc. When no service providers change their bids, the auction ends. If the current winning bids are satisfactory, they become the final winning bids and the auction succeeds. Otherwise, the auction fails.
There are service providers that offer their services with non-negotiable QoS values in the current cloud market, e.g., Amazon. Such service providers can still be included in the auction. Their offers will be compared with other service providers' offers. The differences between those service providers and others are twofold: 1) their offers remain unchanged during the auction until beaten; 2) they do not receive ask-QoSs.
V. CASSMT MECHANISMS
In this section, we present the key mechanisms of CASSMT, including winner determination and ask-QoS generation.
A. WINNER DETERMINATION
To compose a multi-tenant SOS, denoted by S that serves m tenants, a total of m execution plans, ep 1 , . . . , ep m , need to be formulated, one for each tenant. Suppose that S consists of n tasks
is 1 if the j th task is required by the i th tenant, and 0 otherwise. Take the SOS illustrated in Figure 1 for example, the requirement matrix is presented below. 
in B is the u th bid proposed by the k th bidder for the i th execution plan. Each bid b i,k,u contains a set of tasks T i,k,u that b i,k,u is placed on and the QoS offer for T i,k,u denoted by 
Constraints (4) ensure that the winning bids selected for the m th execution plan ep m include all the tasks of ep m . Constraints (5) ensure that no tasks be included in more than one bid. VOLUME 7, 2019 W must also achieve the optimization goal:
where q(S) is a specific quality of S, e.g., cost, response time, reliability, etc., calculated by corresponding quality aggregation functions [3] , [7] , [19] . The above winner determination problem is an NP-hard optimization problem [27] . CASSMT models this problem as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). A CSP consists of a finite set of variables X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, with respective domains D = {D 1 , . . . , D n } listing the possible values for each variable, and a set of constraints C = {c 1 , . . . , c t } over X . A solution to a CSP is an assignment of a value to each variable from its domain such that every constraint is fulfilled and the optimization goal is achieved.
To model the winner determination problem, we define m × r ×t binary variables
, one for each corresponding bid in the bid matrix B. X i,k,u is 1 if bid b i,k,u in B is selected, i.e., the u th bid proposed by the k th bidder is selected to implement the i th execution plan, and 0 otherwise. Given m tenants'l-dimensional quality constraints c i,
Coverage Constraints:
Exclusiveness Constraints:
Quality Constraints:
where q p (ep i ) is the p th dimensional QoS of the i th execution plan, e.g., response time, reliability, etc., calculated by corresponding quality aggregation functions [3] , [7] , [19] . Constraints (7) ensure that at most one bid is selected for each bidder for each execution plan. Constraints (8) guarantee that all the tasks required in each execution plan be included in the selected bids. Constraints (9) ensure that all the tasks required by each execution plan be included in exactly one selected bid. Constraints (10) make sure that all tenant's l-dimensional quality constraints be fulfilled by corresponding execution plans.
It is possible that multiple solutions can fulfil the above constraints. To identify the optimal solution that achieves the system developer's optimization goal, an objective function is included in the CSP, turning it into a constraint optimization problem (COP). Here, we use minimum system cost as the optimization goal as an example: (11) This COP can be solved by applying Integer Programming (IP) technique [32] or mixed integer programming technique [2] , [3] if decimal variables are involved. However, sometimes no feasible solutions to the COP can be found, which indicates that the current bids are not good enough to fulfil all tenants' quality constraints for the SOS. If the stop criterion for the auction is not met, the auction will iterate, allowing bidders to improve their bids. In such cases, we remove constraints (10) from the COP model and find the current best bids, which achieve the optimization goal while fulfilling constraints (7), (8) and (9) . The auctioneer then distributes the current best bids to the bidders as the current winning bids. The bidders can compare it with their own bids to determine whether and how to improve their bids. 
B. ASK-QOS GENERATION
CASSMT employs the same mechanism as CASS [19] for ask-QoS generation at Step 5 of the procedure presented in Figure 2 . Ask-QoS is the offer for QoS asked by the auctioneer based on a bidder's current QoS offer. When no solution can be found to fulfil all tenants' quality constraints based on the current bids, bidders can improve their bids. In order to accelerate the auction, ask-QoSs are generated and sent to bidders to guide them in the improvement of their bids. Bidders can then 1) hold their current bids; 2) accept the ask-QoSs; or 3) propose bids better than the ask-QoSs. This mechanism increases the chances of finding a solution as the auction continues.
During the generation of an ask-QoS for a bidder, minimum decrements are applied to the its current bid. For example, suppose a bidder proposes $100.00 for a service and the minimum decrement of 3% is applied, the ask-price specified in the ask-QoS will be $100.00 × (1.0 − 0.03) = $97.00. Large minimum decrements can quickly filter out uncompetitive bidders at the beginning of an auction. As the auction proceeds, the number of remaining bidders usually decreases. Accordingly, the minimum decrements need to be reduced. Otherwise, it is possible that too many (sometimes all) bidders are filtered out at the same time. This will decrease the chances of finding a solution. CASSMT applies Dynamic Minimum Decrement (DMD) to generate ask-QoSs based on bidders' historic bids. To generate the minimum decrement for the p th dimensional quality of service s i for bidder br k , we first evaluate br k 's ability to improve its bid, we calculate its reserved bidding space. We assume that the current p th dimensional quality value of service s i offered by br k is q k,p (s i ) and a series of br k 's historic bids for
CASSMT first calculates the standard score to measure the deviation between q k,p (s i ) and the corresponding average value of bidder historic bids: 
where
are the maximum and minimum standard scores of br k 's historic bids for q p (s i ).
Given a bidder's reserved bidding space, the auctioneer can generate the corresponding ask-QoS based on a DMD model selected domain-specifically. Figure 3 presents three typical DMD models introduced in [19] , as well as the generation of ask-QoS. The minimum decrement is the y-axis value of the intersection between a zero-crossing straight line with a slope of ε k,p (s i ) and the DMD curve. As the auction proceeds, the bidder's reserved bidding space decreases, as well as the corresponding minimum decrement. In this way, DMD models can efficiently filter out uncompetitive bids. The common characteristic of different DMD models is that the minimum decrement reduces monotonically and progressively over time in an auction. The major difference between different DMD models is how fast the minimum decrement reduces over time.
During an auction, the DMD is calculated for each bidder individually. The reserved bidding space of a bidder is calculated with formula (12) and formula (13) . As indicated by formula (12) and formula (13) , q ave k,p (s i ), q max k,p (s i ) and q min k,p (s i ) are calculated based on the bidder's historic bid alone. They need to be calculated only once and can be reused by formula (12) and formula (13) during the entire auction.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have conducted extensive experiments on a public dataset to compare the effectiveness (measured by success rate and system optimality) and efficiency (measured by the number of auction rounds and computation time) of CASSMT with existing representative approaches. The experiments were conducted on a machine with an Intel i7 2.20 Ghz CPU, 8GB RAM running Microsoft Windows 7 × 64.
A. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a prototype of CASSMT in Java using JDK 1.6.0 and Eclipse Java IDE. To compare CASSMT with existing representative approaches, we have implemented CASS [19] and IPSSMT [17] :
• CASS: CASS is a combinatorial auction-based service selection approach for single-tenant SOSs. It runs a combinatorial auction for an SOS in a way similar to CASSMT, except that it can handle only one tenant's quality constraints at a time. Thus, to accommodate multiple tenants, CASS needs to run multiple auctions, one for each tenant. The winning bidders in one of those auctions do not participate in the other auctions.
• IPSSMT: IPSSMT is an integer programming based service selection approach for multi-tenant SOSs. It fulfils multiple tenants' quality constraints and selects services based on their quality values. The limitation of IPSSMT is that it neither handles service complementarity nor exploits provider competition. We did not implement integer programming based approaches [1] [2] [3] , [37] designed for single-tenant SOS.
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The reason is that significant advantages of IPSSMT over such approaches in handling multi-tenant SOSs have been demonstrated in [17] .
For solving the COP, the prototypes of CASSMT, CASS and IPSSMT use IBM CPLEX v12.5, a linear programming solver.
B. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
In the experiments, we generated service composition scenarios with simulated tenants and bidders, with settings similar to [19] . In those scenarios, we executed CASSMT, CASS and IPSSMT to find solutions to fulfil the same tenants with the same quality constraints, and to achieve the same optimization goal.
In the experiments, a random proportion (between 40 and 60 percent) of the bidders was given the ability to bid for randomly generated service bundles. When bidding for services bundles, those bidders applied randomly generated quality premiums, 5 -15 percent, to their QoS offers for those service bundles. Given n tasks, the theoretical maximum number of different task combinations (including single task), which a bidder can bid for, is n i=1 C i n . However, it is unrealistic in the real world. To model the bidders' behaviors realistically, we restricted the maximum number of different combinations of services that a bidder can bid for in an auction to be equivalent to the number of tasks of the SOS in the auction. For example, if there are 100 tasks of the SBS, each bidder can bid for up to 100 different combinations of services. In the real world, it is the bidders' own decisions to bid for how many and which services or service bundles. CASSMT itself does not limit the way that bidders bid for service bundles.
Bidders' historic bids were generated by following normal distributions based on the quality information of services randomly selected from QWS, a public dataset that contains the quality information on over 2500 real-world web services and has been widely used in the research on service selection [11] . During the auction, bidders' historic bids represent the bidder's offer for a set of specific abstract services. A bid includes complete QoS information that bidders are able and willing to offer. We randomly chose multi-dimensional quality constraints of services in QWS to generate bidders' historic bids. Bidders' bidding behaviors and strategies can be very different. Even if the same bidder s' bidding behaviors can be different from various periods. ThusčBidders' historic bids were generated by following normal distributions to provide general common reference. We generated three types of tenants' quality constraints on the SBS, i.e., simple, medium and severe. We have conducted four sets of experiments under different parameter settings. The change in effectiveness and efficiency of our approach in these scenarios will still be similar to our evaluation in general.
For example, suppose that the average response time of the services that we randomly selected from QWS for a specific task is 300ms. The QoS offers of a corresponding bidder's historic bids and first bid for the task (before the application of a quality premium) are randomly generated by following a normal distribution with 300ms as the mean value and a randomly selected value as the standard deviation. Given a series of historic bids for a bidder, the best bid with the highest utility, which is evaluated using the simple additive weighting technique [11] and introduced in Section 5.2, indicates its reserved quality offer. Because IPSSMT does not allow bidders to improve their bids, it attempts to find a solution based on bidders' first bids for individual tasks. To compare the ability of CASSMT, CASS and IPSSMT to find solutions in scenarios with quality constraints on different difficulty levels, we generated three types of tenants' quality constraints, i.e., simple, medium and severe, as presented in Figure 4 . In Figure 4 , the circles are mapped from bidders' historic bids for a task. In the ''simple'', ''medium'' and ''severe'' cases, tenants' quality constraints were calculated using bids within the ''simple'', ''medium'' and ''severe'' areas in Figure 4 . Apparently, the severe constraints are the most difficult to fulfil because they are demanding in all quality dimensions.
If a solution cannot be found, ask-QoSs are generated and sent to bidders to help them improve their bids. Similar to work in [4] , DMD model #3 is employed for ask-QoS generation in the experiments. Given an ask-QoS, a bidder would simply accept it unless it exceeds its reserved quality offer. In this way, we can isolate the influence of bidders' various bidding strategies in the evaluation of CASSMT, which will be investigated in our future work. For bidders who have reached their reserved quality offers, their current bids remain in the auction until beaten.
To evaluate the impacts of different parameters on CASSMT, CASS and IPSSMT, we have conducted four sets of experiments under different parameter settings. In each set of the experiments, we fixed all other parameters and changed only one of the four parameters: 1) the number of quality constraints; 2) the number of tenants; 3) the number of tasks; and 4) the number of bidders. Table 1 summarizes the parameter settings in different sets of experiments. For example, in experiment set #1, we increased the number of quality constraints from 2 to 9 in steps of 1, while fixing the number of tenants at 5, the number of services at 10, and the number of bidders at 100. In each subset of experiments with a specific parameter setting, 100 experiment instances were run and the results were averaged.
C. EXPERIMENT RESULTS

1) EFFECTIVENESS
The effectiveness of CASSMT, CASS and IPSSMT are measured by their success rates and system optimality. The success rate of an approach is the percentage of scenarios where the approach can find a solution for composing the target SOS. The system optimality is indicated by the system cost achieved by the approach for the target SOS -we employed Equation (11) in the experiments as the optimization goal. A lower system cost indicates a higher auction revenue and a better ability of an approach to achieve the system developer's optimization goal. Figure 5 to Figure 8 compare the success rates of CASSMT, CASS, and IPSSMT versus the four different parameters. Overall, CASSMT achieves the highest success rate and IPSSMT the worst. When the quality constraints are simple, all three approaches achieve a 100% success rate. When the difficulty level of tenants' quality constraints increases to medium, CASSMT and CASS start to show significant advantages over IPSSMT with remarkable higher success rates, 100% vs. 100% vs. 45% on average across four experiment sets. This is because CASSMT and CASS allow bidders to apply quality premiums to their bids based on service complementarity and to improve their bids iteratively. Figure 5 to Figure 8 also demonstrate that, in the severe scenarios, the number of quality constraints, the number of tenants, the number of tasks and the number of bidders impact the success rates of the three approaches more significantly VOLUME 7, 2019 than in the simple and medium scenarios. In the scenarios with severe quality constraints (referred to the severe scenarios), even CASSMT and CASS cannot always guarantee a solution. IPSSMT, among all approaches, achieves the lowest success rate, i.e. 0%. CASSMT outperforms CASS significantly in those scenarios with success rates of 42.6% vs. 34.8% in experiment set #1, 93.8% vs. 87.4% in experiment set #2, 59. 9% vs. 43.7% in experiment set #3 and 93.2% vs. 90.8% in experiment set #4. Figure 9 shows the system cost achieved by CASSMT, CASS and IPSSMT in the simple, medium and severe scenarios under different parameter settings. Note that, Figure 9(a) does not include the data for CASS in the severe scenarios when the number of quality constraints is 9, as well as those for IPSSMT when the number of quality constraints exceeds 7 in the medium and severe scenarios. That is because that CASS and IPSSMT could not find a solution in those scenarios. Overall, CASSMT achieves the lowest systems cost in the same scenarios under the same parameter setting. This demonstrates the outstanding ability of CASSMT to find an optimal solution. CASS seconds to CASSMT whilst IPSSMT shows the worst performance. The advantage of CASSMT over CASS and IPSSMT is more significant in experiment set #1 by 1.5% and 4.78%, #2 by 1.8% and 4.49%, #3 by 0.89% and 1.58%, and #4 by 1.1% and 5.84% respectively. As demonstrated by Figure 9 number of quality constraints results in only slight increases in the system cost achieved by the approaches. This indicates that, although the number of quality constraints significantly impacts the success rate (as presented in Figure 5 ), it does not impact the optimality of the solution significantly as long as one solution can be found. Something similar but with a different overall trend can be observed in Figure 9(d) . The increase in the number of bidders results in slight decreases in the system cost achieved by the three approaches. This indicates that more bidders with more bids lead to fiercer competition and thus allow lower system cost to be achieved. CASSMT, among all three approaches, can best exploit the competition. Figure 9 (b) and Figure 9 (c) show that the system cost increases linearly with the increases in the number of tenants and the number of tasks. This is expected as system cost is an accumulative quality value. To serve for more tenants or find a solution that performs more tasks, the system developer needs more services and builds more expensive SOSs.
a: SUCCESS RATE
b: SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
2) EFFICIENCY
The advantage of CASSMT comes at an inevitable price. CASSMT needs to accommodate all tenants in one auction. Thus, it may need many rounds to complete, allowing bidders to improve their bids until their reserved quality offers are reached or a solution is found. In addition, CASSMT needs to solve the NP-hard winner determination problem many times during an entire auction, one for each auction round (i.e., one iteration). In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of CASSMT measured by the number of auction rounds and overall computation time per solution it needs to complete. Figure 10 to Figure 13 demonstrate the average number of rounds needed to find the solution for the target SOS -needed by CASSMT and CASS to complete respectively in different scenarios under different parameter settings. IPSSMT is not included in those figures because it is not an auctionbased approach and always solves the COP only once to find a solution, which is equivalent to only one auction round. In Figure 10 (c), Figure 11 (c), Figure 12 (c) and Figure 13(c) , the average number of rounds for successful auctions, where a solution is found, and failed auctions, where a solution cannot be found, are included individually. In those figures, CASSMT_Overall is the average of CASSMT_Successful and CASSMT_Failed. Besides CASSMT_Successful and CASSMT_Failed, CASSMT_Overall also relies on the success rate. When the success rate is high, CASSMT_Overall is mainly determined by CASSMT_Successful. When the success rate is low, CASSMT_Failed contributes more significantly to CASSMT_Overall. Overall, CASSMT requires fewer auction rounds per solution than CASS. In the easy and medium scenarios, the performance of CASSMT and CASS are stable. In the easy scenarios, CASSMT requires only close to 1 auction round on average to find a solution, while CASS needs 5.13 rounds. The reason is that CASS needs to run one auction for each tenant. The situation in the severe scenarios is much more complicated, as demonstrated by Figure 10 (c), Figure 11 (c), Figure 12 (c) and Figure 13(c) . In general, the numbers of auction rounds taken per solution by CASSMT and CASS both increase significantly as the difficulty of the quality constraints increases to severe. In addition, the increases in the parameters impact the performance of CASSMT and CASS in ways similar to those in the easy and medium scenarios. Now we focus on the average auction rounds taken by CASSMT per solution. In experiment set #1, CASSMT takes approximately 4.2 rounds to succeed or 9.78 rounds to fail. Overall, as the number of quality constraints increases from 2 to 9, the average number of auction rounds taken by CASSMT increases from 3.31 to 9.84. This indicates that the success rate significantly influences the average auction rounds. As presented in Section 6.3.1, as the scenario scales up, the success rate decreases most of the time in the severe scenarios because it becomes harder for CASSMT to find a solution. As collectively shown by Figure 5 (c) and Figure 10 (c), when the scenario scale begins to increase, although it requires increasingly more rounds to find a solution, CASSMT can still achieve a relatively high success rate. As the scenario scale continues to increase, the success rate begins to decrease and the average duration of successful auctions contributes less to the average overall number of auction rounds. However, taking fewer rounds to complete, failed auctions become more dominant in the determination of the average overall number of auction rounds. This influence of success rate on the number of auction rounds is similar in experiment sets #2, #3 and #4. As shown in Figure 11 (c) and Figure 13 (c), as the number of tenants or bidders increases, the success rate obtained by CASSMT is relatively high and the successful auctions contribute more to the overall number of auction rounds. In Figure 12 (c), the success rate obtained by CASSMT shows a decreasing trend with the increase of services. Accordingly, the successful auctions contribute more to the overall number of auction rounds, but later the failed auctions contribute more.
a: AUCTION ROUNDS
b: COMPUTATION TIME
Solving the COP introduced in Section 5.1 exactly is NP-hard. Thus, CASSMT is time-consuming by nature as it needs to solve a COP in each iteration during an auction. Here, we first analyze and compare the size of the search space of CASSMT, CASS and IPSSMT. The three approaches all model the quality-aware service selection problem as a COP problem. Thus, the size of the search space is a proper indicator for the complexity comparison between them. Given m tenants, n tasks, r bidders and n bids per bidder for each tenant, the sizes of the spaces of CASSMT, CASS and IPSSMT are m × n × r, n × r and r, respectively. Assume that a system developer needs to build an SOS that performs 50 tasks in total to serve 10 tenants, 500 bidders are competing for those tasks, each bidder can propose up to 50 different bids for each tenant. CASSMT needs to identify the winning bids from all the bids. Thus, the size of the search space for CASSMT is the total number of bids: 250,000 (500 × 50 × 10). CASS needs to run 10 auctions in total, one for each tenant. In each of those auctions, CASS needs to identify the winning bids from a total of 25,000 (500 × 50) bids in each auction. To identify a solution that includes 10 execution plans for the 10 tenants, CASS needs to run 10 such auctions. IPSSMT does not consider provider competition and service complementarity. Each service provider can have only one QoS offer for their services. In total, there are 500 QoS offers for IPSSMT to choose from.
With logarithmic charts for better readability, Figure 14 compares the per-solution computation time -the total amount of computation time consumed to find a solution for the target SOS -of CASSMT, CASS and IPSSMT in various scenarios under different settings. In the same scenarios, the computation time of CASSMT is higher than those of CASS and IPSSMT. The average computation time of CASSMT across all experiments in experiment set #1 is 2,645ms vs. 1,501ms of CASS and 211ms of IPSSMT, 1,269ms vs. 1,051ms vs. 190ms in experiment set #2, 7,828ms vs. 5,028ms vs. 249ms in experiment #3 and 4,779ms vs. 4,143ms vs. 254ms in experiment set #4. Every time CASSMT attempts to solve the COP, it needs to include all tenants' quality constraints in the COP model as constraints, according to formula (10) . The consideration of multiple tenants also increases the numbers of XOR constraints, coverage constraints and exclusiveness constraints, according to formulae (7), (8) , and (9) respectively. The additional constraints, as compared to CASS and IPSSMT, significantly complicate the COP for CASSMT, making it much more difficult for CASSMT to find a solution. This is reflected by the significantly extra computation time of CASSMT compared with CASS and IPSSMT, as presented in Figure 14 . In 10% of all cases, the total computation time of CASSMT is less than 10 seconds. In the experiments on the largest scale, i.e., experiment set #3 with 50 tasks, CASSMT requires an average of 16,107ms per solution. This is acceptable in most, if not all, cases. In a real-world application, the computation time needed per auction round is much less as the total computation time is distributed across different auction rounds. The actual impacts on the auctioneers and the bidders are also much less significant, since it would be absorbed by the time needed for bidders to improve and submit their bids at each auction around. We focus on economic efficiency and pay more attention to economic benefit. CASSMT handles multi-tenancy by attempting to find an optimal solution that fulfils all tenants' quality constraints. However, for largescale applications, CASSMT will take a very large amount of time to find a solution due to the high complexity of the NPhard COP. In such scenarios, finding a near-optimal solution quickly might be more desirable than finding an optimal solution slowly. Figure 14 also shows that the increases in the four parameters all result in an increase in the computation times of CASSMT, CASS and IPSSMT in different scenarios. This confirms our analysis earlier -the complexity of solving the COP increases as it scales up. The patterns in Figure 14 (a) -(d) are similar. Overall, the computation times of all approaches are not significantly higher except in the severe scenarios. In the severe scenarios, the computation times of CASSMT and CASS are remarkably higher than IPSSMT. This is expected because, in severe scenarios, CASSMT and CASS require more auction rounds to complete and thus spend more time solving multiple COPs, one in each auction round. The increase in the computation time of CASSMT is more significant than that of CASS, by 76% in experiment set #1, 20.7% in set #2, 55.68% in set #3 and 15.35% in set #4.
The experimental results demonstrate that the efficiency of CASSMT is acceptable in most real-world applications, especially given its high effectiveness demonstrated in Section 6.3.1.
VII. RELATED WORK
Service selection for single-tenant SOSs has been known as a NP-hard question [5] . Service selection for multi-tenant SOSs is even more complicated due to the need to fulfil multiple tenants' quality constraints [17] . In the past decade, many approaches for quality-aware service selection have been proposed to compose single tenant SOSs [1] [2] [3] , [36] , [37] and multi-tenant SOSs [6] , [17] , [18] , [25] , [28] , [35] . In this section, we discuss some of the most representative existing work.
A. SINGLE-TENANT APPROACHES
In [36] and [37] , Zeng et al. present AgFlow, a middleware platform that enables quality-driven composition of web services. Integer programming technique is employed to compute the optimal solution to an SOS from candidate execution plans represented by Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). Following the work in [36] and [37] , in [3] , Ardagna and Pernici formulate the quality-aware service selection problem as mixed integer programming problem and adopt loops peeling for optimization. When a feasible solution does not exist, a QoS negotiation algorithm is suggested to enlarge the solution space of the optimization problem. Alrifai and Risse [1] adopt a heuristic distributed method to find the best web services that meet local quality constraints generated by decomposing global quality constraints using, again, integer programming techniques. They then propose in [2] an approach based on the notion of skyline to reduce the search space for the problem of quality-aware service composition. In [21] , Li et al. use a different philosophy from the works described above to address the quality-aware service selection problem. They use Service Composition Graph (SCG) to represent the SOS. Then, they employ Dijkstra's shortest-path algorithm to find the optimal solution to the SOS. In [29] , Wang et al. find that optimal solutions can be found in polynomial time for some specially structured SOSs that consist of three services. Algorithms are proposed to detect whether the optimal solution can be found for a given SOS in polynomial time. Attempting to maintain the optimality of SOSs at runtime, Cardellini et al. [8] , [9] propose MOSES (Model-based Selfadaptation of SOA systems), a methodology and prototype that model the problem of service selection for SOS adaptation also as integer programming problems. The common and critical limitation of these existing approaches in the cloud environment is that they only support single-tenant SOSs. A workaround is to employ these approaches to create multiple execution plans or systems for multiple tenants one after another, like IPSSMT described in Section 6. The result is that, although the created systems may be able to fulfil individual tenants' quality constraints, the overall system quality is usually sub-optimal [18] . The optimization goal for the SOS cannot be achieved. Our experimental results presented in Section 6.3 have confirmed this.
B. MULTI-TENANT APPROACHES
Compared with single-tenant SOSs, multi-tenant SOSs have many obvious benefits, e.g., reducing the delivery cost for system vendors, offering cost-effective solutions for tenants, improving the utilization of hardware resources for system administrators. The transition from single-tenancy to multi-tenancy in SOSs has raised many issues that attracted researchers' attention in the past few years [6] , [17] , [18] , [25] , [28] , [35] . Pathirage et al. [25] present the architecture of their multi-tenant business process engine based on BPEL. SOSs built upon this engine can achieve the second multi-tenancy level by sharing the process engine across multiple tenants. This piece of work builds the foundation for the implementation of multi-tenant SOSs based on BPEL. However, this engine does not provide system quality assurance, which relies completely on the quality of the services selected for execution. In [18] , we present an approach to quality-aware service selection for multi-tenant SBSs. We model the service selection problem as a COP where tenants' differentiated quality constraints are modelled as multiple sets of constraints. Following our work, Lei et al. [20] adopt queuing theory and reliability theory to enable multi-tenant SOS to adapt to changes in individual tenants' networking environments. Wada et al. [28] design a multi-objective genetic algorithm named E 3 to produce a set of Pareto execution plans for multiple tenants of an SOS. Each execution plan fulfils an individual tenant's quality requirements. Cai et al. [6] propose a new concept named service granularity space (SGS) based on granularity computing. SGS aims to address many issues in multi-tenant SOSs, including multi-granularity, massive customization, service correlation and system evolution. In [17] and [18] , we propose several approaches to support service selection for SOSs on different maturity levels of multi-tenancy based on integer programming techniques. However, none of the existing approaches fully consider the complementarity between services and the competition among providers. Consequently, these approaches suffer from poor success rates for multitenant SOSs, especially in scenarios where tenants' quality requirements are severe.
Combinatorial auction is widely recognized as a promising approach to provide bidders (i.e. service providers) with flexible bidding options, hence allowing bidders to compete in SLA negotiation for service composition [11] . In this paper, we propose CASSMT, the first approach that supports effective quality-ware service selection for multi-tenant SOSs by systematically and fully addressing three critical issues: 1) multi-tenancy; 2) service complementarity; and 3) provider competition.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose CASSMT, a novel Combinatorial Auction-based Service Selection for Multi-Tenant SOSs. It differs from existing approaches because 1) it can handle multiple tenants' quality constraints simultaneously; 2) it allows the complementarity between services to be expressed by service providers as quality premiums; and 3) it fully exploits the competition among service providers. The experimental results demonstrate that CASSMT is able to significantly improve the success rate of finding the optimal solution as well as the system optimality. Meanwhile, the efficiency, measured by the number of auction rounds and the computation time is demonstrated to be acceptable in most, if not all, cases.
Bidders' various bidding behaviors and strategies can potentially impact the effectiveness and efficiency of CASSMT. As future work, we will investigate this issue. Double auctions have the ability to increase the probability of buyer-seller matching and to reduce the computational burden of single-sided auctions [12] , [31] . Thus, inspired by [24] , we will investigate the combination of combinatorial auction and double auction to improve CASSMT. 
